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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent studies by Bekaert and Harvey (BH, 1997 and 2000) and Aggarwal, Inclan, and Leal (AIL, 1999)
examine the volatility of equity indexes in emerging markets. BH find that capital market liberalizations increase the
susceptibilities of emerging markets to world factors but that — after controlling for cross-country differences in
relevant variables — emerging market volatilities decline after liberalizations occur. BH suggest that emerging market
volatilities change gradually because liberalization itself is gradual.
Unlike BH, AIL identify sudden shifts in volatility and then look for local or global events that can explain
these shifts. Except the stock market crash in October 1987, all shifts in the AIL analys s st m from local events. This
finding is consistent with Bailey and Chung’s (1995) evidence concerning volatility shifts in the Mexican equity market
and with the relatively low (but increasing) fractions of emerging market variances explained by world factors in the BH
(1997) analysis.
We extend BH and AIL in several ways. Like AIL, we examine shifts in volatility around specific events. Like
BH, we use events that should increase market integration a priori. Unlike either study, we examine shifts for individual
firms. Thus, we use firm-specific data with volatilities measured over daily intervals to discern the impact on volatility of
one event in the integration and liberalization process. As BH argue, understanding volatility is important for
determining the cost of capital and for examining direct investment decisions. To the extent such decisions are not driven
solely by market-wide factors, our analysis of firm-specific influences should enhance decision makers’ understanding of
volatility.
The event we study is the issue of Global Depositary Receipts (GD s) by Indian firms from 1992 through
1998. India’s economic liberalization process includes a wide gamut of domestic economic activities. However, its GDR
program is widely considered to have provided the most direct link between Indian firms and world capital markets. The
non-convertibility of the Indian rupee, the restrictions on foreign investments in Indian securities, and the prior inability
of Indian firms to issue securities in an overseas public offering make the GDR program a critical element of India’s
liberalization process. Under this program (explained in greater detail in Section II), Indian firms were permitted for the
first time to raise public funding abroad. All Indian GDRs ssued to date have been issued in Europe and/or the U.S. 
The home-market impact of these issues on the volatility of the underlying shares in Bombay and the potential volatility
spillover from markets into which these GDRs were issued form the focus of our study. Besides extending BH and
AIL, we also extend Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Miller (1999) who examine home-market price effects when
foreign firms first issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Both studies interpret their evidence to support
Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis that implies that ADR issues help integrate world markets. We extend
these studies by examining volatility shifts that occur when Indian firms issue GDRs under the SEC’s Rule 144A and/or
Regulation S. GDRs differ from ADRs in that they trade in the U.S. and other countries simultaneously. Rule 144A and
Regulation S issues differ from publicly traded issues in that they trade only among Qualified Institutional Buyers on the
NASD PORTAL system and/or on Designated Offshore Securities Markets.
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2Though firms in almost 60 foreign countries have used Rule 144A and/or Regulation S to issue equity since
1991, Indian firms have dominated the market. They account for approximately 14% of the Rule 144A offerings and for
approximately 19% of the Regulation S offerings through 1997.1 Though such issues are less liquid and require less
disclosure than publicly traded ADRs,Pinegar and Ravichandran (1999) show that the effects on Indian firms of issuing
Rule 144A and Regulation S GDRs are similar to the effects on non-Indian firms of issuing publicly traded ADRs. Thus,
to the extent ADRs help integrate markets, GDRs should help also.
Besides Merton’s (1987) hypothesis, other factors predict changes in firm-specific volatilities following GDR
issues. Healy and Palepu (1989) argue, for example, that U.S. investors perceive that business risk will increase when
U.S. firms issue seasoned equity. Such expectations may contribute to the announcement period decline in stock prices
observed in studies of seasoned equity offerings [e.g., Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986)].
Increased business risk may also be part of the “window of opportunity” hypothesis of Loughran and Ritter (1995). If
Indian managers issue GDRs with the foreknowledge that business risk will increase, stock price volatilities should
increase after the offer. However, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1999) argue that GDR announcements convey “good
news” to the Indian market. If that news relates to future changes in risk, we expect post-issue stock price volatilities to
decline.2 Even if business risk remains the same, volatilities could decline because the equity infusions from GDR issues
reduce financial leverage [See Black (1976) and Christie (1982)].
Of course, macro factors also influence volatilities. H mao, Masulis, and Ng (1990) and King and Wadhwani
(1990) document volatility spillovers across international equity markets, and BH show that emerging market volatilities
become more susceptible to world market influences after markets are liberalized. If GDRs increase Indian firms’ world
market exposure, world market spillovers may make Indian firms’ stocks more volatile after the issue than they were
before. However, BH and AIL show that local, not global, factors cause most of the change in emerging market
volatilities. Thus, macro-induced changes in volatility may be limited to home-market influences.
To determine whether potential volatility shifts result from firm-specific or global or local macroeconomic
forces, we estimate time-varying volatility for each of the firms in our sample, and for market indexes in India, Europe,
and the U.S.  Estimates are calculated for 200 trading days before and after the GDR issue by each firm.3 Po t-issue
volatilities are lower than pre-issue volatilities for over two-thirds of our sample. Reductions occur with even greater
frequency in the Indian index. However, neither the European nor the U.S. index experiences similar declines, and only
scanty evidence exists of volatility spillovers from Europe and the U.S. to India either before or after GDRs were issued.
Evidence of changes in firms’ betas measured with respect to appropriate foreign market indexes is equally weak. Thus,
the decline in volatility for Indian stocks in Bombay does not appear to be caused by changes in volatility in foreign
markets where the GDRs trade. These findings are consistent with the findings in BH and with AIL that emerging
market volatility is caused primarily by home-market influences. However, our analysis shows that systematic and firm-
specific local events contribute to the reductions in volatility we document.
Though we focus only on GDRs, the importance of the Rule 144A and Regulation S markets adds significance
to our findings. In 1999 alone, foreign firms raised more than $21 billion through ADRs and GDRs. Of the 10 largest
issues, three were 144A GDRs in which one Taiwanese and two Korean firms raised a total of $1.92 billion.
Approximately 40% of the DRs issued in 1999 were Rule 144A and/or Regulation S issues.4 Since private and offshore
issues can be large and relatively frequent sources of funding for foreign firms and can help integrate financial markets,
understanding the impact on individual firms of GDR issues is important.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the SEC’s Rule 144A and Regulation S and
describes important steps in the liberalization of the Indian market. Section III describes our data and statistical methods.
Section IV describes our empirical results, and Section V concludes.
II.  DESCRIPTION OF RULE 144A/REGULATION S, DATA , AND STATISTICAL METHODS
A. Rule 144A and Regulation S
In April 1990, the SEC adopted Rule 144A which governs the resale of privately placed securities by Qualified
Institutional Buyers (QIBs).5 Because Rule 144A attempts to provide an efficient and liquid market for institutional
investors, no waiting period exists for trading these securities if buyers and sellers are both QIB . Trades of 144A
offerings are executed under the PORTAL (Private Offerings Resales and Trading through Automated Linkages)
system, established in 1990 by the NASD. The system is a computerized, screen-based, quotation, trading, settlement
and clearing system. Only “non-fungible” securities (i.e., securities that are not part of the same class as securities
3simultaneously listed on a U.S. exchange or OTC) can trade on the PORTAL system. PORTAL trades are cleared
through the Depository Trust Corporation. GDRs issued under Rule 144A by Indian firms are not “listed” on U.S.
exchanges. However, PORTAL trading and other telecommunications options provide some liquidity for U.S. QIBs.
The SEC also adopted Regulation S in April 1990. Regulation S governs the registration of offshore
placements by both U.S. and foreign issuers. It also provides guidelines for subsequent secondary market resal s within
the U.S. of securities originally issued as offshore placements by both foreign and U.S. issuers. Aggarwal, Gray, and
Singer (1999) and Choi (2000) discuss the use of offshore markets for raising capital. Unlike Rule 144A, Regulation S
prohibits pre-selling securities in the U.S.  To avoid subjection to U.S. securities laws, Regulation S offerings must be
sold and come to rest outside the U.S. with no efforts to sell initially inside the U.S.  However, Regulation S placements
may trade on many exchanges internationally where securities trade that are not echnically listed. The SEC recognizes
16 such exchanges as “Designated Offshore Securities Markets” or “DOSM.”6 Trades on DOSM are settled through
European Clearing Agencies CEDEL or EUROCLEAR rather than through exchange facilities per se. If a U.S. broker,
acting for a U.S. customer, places an order on the DOSM for securities issued under Regulation S, the SEC treats the
transaction as “offshore.” The U.S. purchaser (if not a dealer or distributor) can then resell such securities without
restriction in the U.S.  The direct access of Regulation S offerings to DOSM and their indirect access to U.S. markets
enhances the liquidity of offshore placements.
B. Liberalizing the Indian Market
Though BH (2000, Table I) list November 1992 as the official liberalization date of the Indian market, the
process may have begun earlier. Henry (2000, Table II), for example, uses June 1986 because that was when the India
country fund was first introduced. However, as BH stress, liberalization is a gradu l process. The purpose of this
section is to discuss a few of the steps in that process for India.
In July 1991, the Indian government announced the New Industrial Policy to liberalize its economy. In 1992,
the Indian Parliament created the Securities and Exchange Board of India with statutory authority to oversee India’s
capital markets. The Securities and Exchange Board has initiated and implemented extensive reforms in all 23 Indian
stock exchanges including the introduction of electronic trading and order matching systems.
The Bombay Stock Exchange, the biggest and most important stock exchange in India, operates from 9:30 a.m.
to 4:00 p.m. weekdays. Clearing and settlement operations are managed by National Securities Clearing Corporation.
Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) discuss operations of the Bombay Stock Exchange at an earlier stage in their evolution
and report that (except for carryover provisions) settlement took place every 14 days. Currentl , the exchange facilitates
multiple settlement mechanisms including account period (Wednesday through Tuesday) and rolling perio  (five
business days) settlements. 7
Indian stock exchanges currently have no market makers bound to give two-way quotes or to act as dealers
for any particular stock. Therefore, bid-ask spreads as known in the U.S. do not exist on the Bombay Stock
Exchange. However, in March of 1998, the Securities and Exchange Board established a committee to study market
making and to draft procedures for its implementation. The committee released its report in October 1999 and the
Securities and Exchange Board finalized guidelines for market making in January 2000.8
As part of its Economic Liberalization Policy, the Indian government announced in 1992 that Foreign
Institutional Investors could invest directly in Indian securities under specific guidelines, issued by the Reserve Bank
of India and the Securities and Exchange Board. Other sources of foreign investments include Non-Resident Indians,
Overseas Corporate Bodies, and GDRs. To date, severe restrictions are placed on each source. We di cuss r strictions
specific to Foreign Institutional Investors and GDRs.
Foreign Institutional Investors must register with the Securities and Exchange Board in accordance with
guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance before they trade securities of companies listed on Indian stock
exchanges. Since the Indian rupee is not freely convertible, Foreign Institutional Investors also fall under the purview
of India’s Foreign Exchange Regulation Act issued by the Reserve Bank. Besides their application to the Securities
and Exchange Board for initial registration, therefore, Foreign Institutional Investors must apply with the Reserve
Bank for permission. They must also register with the SEC or the comparable regulatory body in their respective
countries of domicile or incorporation. Though ownership restrictions vary across industries, combined investments
of all Foreign Institutional Investors in primary and secondary markets in India may, in general, not exceed 24% of
capital in any company. Holdings of a single Foreign Institutional Investor in any company may not exceed 5% of
capital.
4BH (2000, Table I) indicate that as of December 1995, the U.S. percentage ownership of Indian firms was
only 1.14%, third lowest of the emerging market countries for which data are available in the BH analysis. At the nd of
1998, only 200 Foreign Institutional Investors were registered with the Securities and Exchange Board of India.
Bloomenthal (1998) reports, however, that there are 4,000 QIBs. How many Foreign Institutional Investors were
registered with the Securities and Exchange Board and were also among the 4,000 QIBs is unknown. However, even if
all Foreign Institutional Investors were QIBs, the overwhelming majority (3,800 of 4,000) of QIBs eligible to purchase
Indian GDRs are not eligible to buy Indian shares on the home market.9 Thus, large increases in direct foreign holdings
of Indian shares through GDR issues seem unlikely.
Before 1992, Indian law prohibited Indian companies from issuing securities publicly outside of India. As part
of the New Industrial Policy, the New Economic Liberalization Policy formalized on April 1, 1992 permitted Indian
firms to raise capital outside India through GDRs. Since the Indian rupee is not freely convertible in world markets,
Indian firms that raise funds denominated in foreign currencies must obtain permission from the Ministry of Finance.
GDRs may be denominated in any freely convertible foreign currency and may be listed on any international stock
exchange outside India. These GDRs may be purchased, possessed and transferred among persons who are
“nonresident” as defined under Section 2(q) of subsection 46 of India’s Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Indian
citizens are prohibited from investing in these GDRs. The ordinary shares underlying the GDRs are denominated
only in rupees and trade only in India. The issuing firms are required to abide by all other relevant Indian laws.
If GDR holders ask the overseas depositary to redeem the GDRs for the underlying shares, their requests
must be transmitted to the custodian bank in India and then to the issuing company. For much of our sample period,
GDR holders who wanted to redeem could do so only for direct sale of the released shares on the Bombay Stock
Exchange. They could not redeem the GDR and hold the underlying shares. To the extent arbitrage depends on
quickness, the time required to notify the domestic custodian bank and the issuing company would limit arbitrage
activities.
Though provisions in Rule 144A and Regulation S are intended to enhance liquidity of private and offshore
security placements, the limitations on Foreign Institutional Investors’ ability to own and trade Indian firms’ shares and
the prohibitions on Indian citizens against owning and trading GDRs may impede the flow of information between the
markets in which the GDRs trade (Europe and the U.S.) and the Indian market where the underlying shares trade. Thus,
volatility spillovers between markets may also be limited. Nevertheless, we test for such spillovers below.
III.  DATA AND STATISTICAL METHODS
Table 1 lists the calendar time distribution of sample GDR issues from 1992 through the middle of 1998.
Economic Times, an Indian business daily similar to the Wall Street Journal, gives the month and year of each issue for
both debt and equity GDRs. Our sample contains 60 of the 66 equity-backed Indian GDRs issued over the sample
period.10 Thirty-seven of these occurred in 1994. This clustering extends across SEC provisions, though single-
provision offers occur relatively more frequently in the early and middle parts of the sample, while tandem offers occur
more frequently in the middle and later parts.11
A potential explanation for the clustering in Table 1 is Loughran and Ritter’s (1995) “window of opportunity”
hypothesis. To illustrate, Figure 1 compares price movements of the Bombay “Sensex” Index (BSE) to movements in a
European and a World index. Daily data for the BSE and for individual Indian stock prices used in our analysis come
from the PROWESS data base maintained by the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) in Bombay.Data for
the European and World indexes and for exchange rates to convert Indian Rupees to U.S. dollars come from
Bloomberg.
The figure, which uses December 31, 1991 as the base date, shows th  BSE prices doubled in early 1992
while the European and World indexes remained fairly flat. Though the BSE declined and remained close to European
and World index levels from mid-1993 to the end of the year, it rose again quickly and remained high throughout 1994
and into 1995. The clustering in Table 1 coincides with the strong Indian market performance vis-a-vis European and
other world markets. This pattern supports Lough an and Ritter’s (1995) evidence and may suggest that Indian
managers take advantage of attractive conditions to issue equity. If those conditions include knowledge that business risk
will increase after GDRs are issued, stock prices should be more volatile after the issue than they were before. Of
course, the need for Indian firms to get approval from the Ministry of Finance to issue GDRs may limit this explanation.
5BH (2000) argue, for example, that governments may only let firms issue ADRs when it is most advantageous to the
government, even if stock prices are low.However, Figure 1 clearly indicates that most Indian firms that issued GDRs
did so when their home market was performing well relative to other world markets.
Table 2 categorizes the sample by the exchange (DOSM) on which the GDR trades. Data for this table come
from Bloomberg. Indian GDRs trade on a combination of three exchanges — the London International Exchange,
Luxembourg, and Frankfurt. [In London and Luxembourg, GDRs trade in U.S. dollars. In Frankfurt, they trade in
Deutsche Marks.] If GDRs trade on a single exchange, the most frequent choice (21 of 60) is Luxembourg. However, 12
GDRs trade on all three exchanges and 21 trade on both the London International Exchange and the Luxembourg
Exchange. Besides trading on one or more of these exchanges, all GDRs either trade in the U.S. on PORTAL or are
considered “PORTAL” securities in that they trade on a DOSM. So, all GDRs in our sample fall under SEC jurisdiction.
If GDRs increase Indian firms’ world market exposure, Indian stocks may become more susceptible to volatility
spillovers especially from the markets in which the GDRs trade.To examine this conjecture, we use the S&P 500 and
the Bloomberg European index as proxies for the U.S. and DOSM influences.
Measuring spillovers with daily data requires adjustments for trading time differences across markets. Figure 2
diagrams trading hours of Indian and U.S. markets and of European DOSM, all in Indian Standard Time. Tra ing hours
in India overlap trading hours in all the DOSM, but not in the U.S.  In the tests below, we use volatility estimates on
calendar day t-1 for the S&P 500 and the European indexes to predict day t volatilities on the Indian stocks. Addi ionally
(despite the overlap between Indian and European trading times), we also include day t’s European volatility estimates
to capture day t’s Indian volatilities. We use the same timing conventions to estimate Indian stocks’ foreign market
betas. The spillover and beta results are virtually insensitive to whether we use day t-1 alone or combined with day t to
estimate connections between Europe and India.
We estimate time-varying volatility with two methods. Th  first relies on work by Chesney, Ellliott, Madan, and
Yang (CEMY, 1993) and Pastorello (1996). These authors propose a simple filtering procedure to recover a series of
realized volatilities from a discrete time realization of a continuous time diffusion process.Let Pi,t be the lo ing value of
stock (or index) i on day t and Xi,t = ln (Pi,t), CEMY and Pastorello show that
is an approximately unbiased estimator of asset i’s return volatility at time t, where i=-2/3i2 and where  and 
are, respectively, the mean and standard deviation of daily returns for asset i over the s mple period. CEMY use this
measure to construct point estimates of time-varying volatility and cov r a ion with risk factors to test Merton’s (1973)
Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model. We use it for point estimates for the Indian stocks and the Indian, European,
and U.S. indexes to measure potential volatility spillovers.
Use of close-to-close prices with the CEMY method poses some challenges with our data. We use data only if
the stock in question trades on the particular day and only if Indian and world markets are both open. Because of
differences in holidays, the Indian market is not always open when other world markets are and vice versa. Differences
in holidays, nontrading in individual stocks, and the absence of continuous bid-ask quotes imply that (Xi,t+1 - Xi,t) in (1)
is not always measured over equal horizons. Thus, variances measured by the CEMY method are not strictly daily
variances.12
6To remedy this problem, we also use Parkinson’s (1980) extreme-value volatility estimator, defined as
where Hi,t and Li,t are the intra day high and low price for stock (or index) i on trading day t. Wiggins (1991) finds that,
after an outlier screen is applied to the data, the extreme-value estimator is significantly more efficient than the close-to-
close estimators he examines.13 However, Ball and Torous (1984) warn that, as a class, high-low estimators “must more
fully integrate the closed market effect” because observed (trading time) security price highs and lows may not
correspond to actual (which includes overnight) security price highs and lows. Thus, even though the trading period over
which volatility is measured is the same for each estimate with Parkinson’s estimator, the assumption that security price
dynamics are the same in open and closed markets is almost certainly incorrect. Hence, both the CEMY and the
Parkinson estimators have limitations. Nevertheless, if the strengths of one method compensate for weaknesses of the
other, using both methods should allow reasonable inferences.
 Table 3 provides summary estimates of the CEMY and Parkinson estimates of volatility for the sample firms
and for each of the indexes. CEMY estimates are the square roots of Vi,t from equation (1). Parkinson estimates are as
given by equation (2). The table reports means and medians of the estimates and of the mean lag one autocorrelation
coefficients and mean cross-method correlation coefficients using 200 trading observations before and after the issue
date. The Indian index is the BSE, the U.S. index is the S&P 500, and the European index is a Bloomberg index for
which only the CEMY estimator is used because only closing prices are available.
Mean and median volatility estimates in Table 3 are approximately equal across methods.14 The mean cr ss-
method correlations are also positive (.492 to .657) and significant at the .01 level. However, they suggest that, on
average, one method explains only 24 to 43 percent of the variation in the other. Thus, though both methods produce
consistent estimates, each contains information the other does not have. The table also shows that lag one
autocorrelations for the volatility estimates are positive and significant, especially for the Parkinson method. This finding
suggests some form of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasiticity which we control for simply by including a one-
period lagged volatility estimate in the regressions that follow.
We also perform robustness checks using time-varying conditional volatilities. However, because of the trading
gaps discussed in footnote 12, time-varying volatility estimates based on ARCH and/or GARCH processes suffer from
the same deficiencies as the CEMY method with our data. Hansen (1995) also argues that parameterizing conditional
variances with GARCH methods requires assumptions about the parameters that may not be correct. Nevertheless, we
attempt to impose the Glosten, Jaganathan, and Runkle (GJR, 1993) structure on conditional variances for individual
firms. The numbers of GJR coefficients that are significant at the .10 level in our sample are 46 for the lagged
conditional variance, 29 for the lagged squared error, and 13 for the asymmetric lagged squared error. Thus, the GJR
structure is inappropriate for many firms in our sample. A simple ARCH process is somewhat more successful than the
GJR process in describing conditional variances for individual Indian firms, but the ARCH model produces results that
are similar to the results presented below. Thus, we report results only for the CEMY and Parkinson methods.
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Figures 3 and 4 present times series means of the CEMY and Parkinson estimates for the 60 firms in our
sample, centered on the respective issue dates. Though the CEMY estimates exhibit more variability than the Parkinson
estimates (possibly because they measure variability over longer horizons) both series show similar patterns. Both
decline over time, and both show a spike at or near the issue date compared with observations in surrounding periods.
The post-issue decline is consistent with evidence in BH(1997). However, the BH comparisons are market-wide
comparisons in calendar time before and after general liberalization dates, while our comparisons are in event time
before and after specific GDR issue dates. The mean issue-date spike for the CEMY (Parkinson) method is the
7eighteenth (first) largest spike in the total time series. These spikes are consistent with the hypothesis that imperfectly
anticipated information is released when GDRs are issued.15
To measure the impact of GDR issues more formally, we now create time series dummy variables labeled
“Before,” “Event1, ” “Event2,” and “After.” Observations corresponding to these labels are trading days -200 through -
26, -25 through 0, 1 through 25, and 26 through 200, respectively.16 Using the dummy variables, we run the following
regression
where Voli,t is either the CEMY or the Parkinson volatility estimate and  i,t is the error term. Isolating the periods
immediately surrounding the issue date eliminates potentially short-lived volatility shifts attributable to the issue itself.
To test the hypothesis of permanent shifts, we examine the equality of a1 and a4. Tests of the equality of these and other
coefficients use White’s (1980) standard errors. We run regressions for each Indian firm and for each index over the
corresponding time interval. Mean and median coefficient estimates and p-values for each test are reported in Table 4.
The regressions confirm what Figures 3 and 4 suggest. Post-issue volatilities of Indian firms differ significantly
from pre-issue volatilities. Mean CEMY and Parkinson estimates of a4 (.0157 and .0137) are approximately 10 percent
lower than the corresponding estimates for a1 (.0177 nd .0155). Mean (median) p-values for tests of the hypothesis that
a1 = a4 are .226 (.051) and .181 (.037) for the CEMY and Parkinson methods, respectively. Thus, a4 is s gnificantly
different from a1 at the .100 level for more than half our sample firms. In contrast, mean and median p-values for tests of
the hypothesis that a1 = a4 for the U.S. and European indexes are all greater than .100. Thus, the decline in volatility for
Indian stocks in Bombay does not appear to be caused by changes in volatility in foreign (U.S. and European) markets
where the GDRs trade.
The volatility of the Indian index, however, declines in the same fashion as the volatility of the individual firms.
This finding may be due to the clustering in our sample. If most GDRs were issued just before a decline in Indian market
volatility, the volatility of individual Indian stocks would decline with the market. Alternatively, GDR issues may have
contributed to a decline that would not have been as pronounced if GDRs had not been issued. We examine the evidence
for these different interpretations below. However, we first decompose volatility into trading time and overnight
volatility. Then, we examine the stability of overnight volatilities and the pervasiveness of our findings across individual
stocks.
Table 5 reports results from regression (3) for overnight Parkinson estimates. Because our data do not have
high and low prices for overnight trading, we substitute the absolute value of the ratio of the open price to the preceding
close price for the high-low ratio in the Parkinson estimator. Overnight volatility is smaller than trading time volatility
for all assets we examine, but especially for the U.S. index. Compared with a1 and a4 in Table 4, a1 nd a4 in Table 5 are
approximately 10 percent as large for the U.S. index, 30 to 40 percent as large for the Indian index, and 70 percent as
large for individual Indian stocks. Nevertheless, the patterns in the tables are the same. There is a significant, permanent
decline in the volatilities of most individual Indian stocks and of the Indian index, but no noticeable change for the U.S.
index.
Table 6 examines the significance of the volatility shifts in more detail for the CEMY method and for the
Parkinson estimator using trading time and overnight intervals. Each cell contains two numbers. The first is the total
number of differences between a1 and 4 that are significant at the .10 level. The second is the number of significant
shifts for which a4 < a1 . With 60 independent experiments, we expect six differences to be significant by random chance
alone. The numbers in Table 6 exceed the expected number at the .05 level for each asset class and each method. This
finding underscores the variation in volatilities over time. 
More interesting, however, is the direction of the movements. Random shifts should produce approximately
equal numbers of significant upward and downward movements. However, the U.S. index has significantly fewer (8/25)
significant negative shifts, while individual firms (27/36) and the Indian index (32/37) have significantly more negative
shifts than chance alone would predict. The European index (14/18) also has significantly more negative shifts than
chance alone would predict, but the total number of significant shifts is less than half the total number of significant
8shifts for the Indian index or for individual Indian firms. Though the numbers reported here are for CEMY estimates,
Parkinson estimates support similar conclusions. Again, this evidence may suggest that events in our sample are
dependent because of clustering, or that the clustering of independent events contributes to the dampening of market
volatility occasioned by subsiding macroeconomic influences.
Before separating general market movements from individual firm effects, we look for potential volatility
spillovers from the U.S. and Europe into the prices of individual firms. Though our results so far suggest that volatilities
of Indian firms and the Indian index are related to each other but not to volatilities of the U.S. and European indexes, we
have focused only on central tendencies. Differences in central tendencies in pre- and post-issue periods may not be
good surrogates for correlations between volatility movements measured on a daily basis. To examine whether such
correlations exist and whether they change after GDR issuances, we run the following regression
where Volj,t-1 is the volatility estimate for the U.S. or European index and VolBSE,t is the volatility estimate for the Indian
index, and all other variables retain their previous definitions. Including VolBSE,t an  Voli,t-1 controls for concurrent
changes in the volatility of the home index and for lagged changes in individual volatilities.
Results of regressions (4) are in Table 7. As expected, volatilities of Indian stocks relate directly to volatilities
of the Indian market, with mean (median) estimates for c approximately equal to .5, and with median p-values all below
.010. Similar results also hold for the coefficient (d) on own-firm lagged volatility. However, mean and median estimates
of both baft and bbef are small and insignificant. Tests of the hypothesis that baft = bbef yield p-values that are also mostly
greater than .200. Thus, only scanty evidence exists that GDR issues expose home-market investors to volatility
spillovers from the foreign markets into which the GDRs were issued.17
We also estimate domestic and foreign-market betas for Indian firms before and after GDR issues. To conserve
space, we do not report the results of these regressions in a separate table. However, as with regressions (4), these
regressions produce little evidence that U.S. and European markets influence Indian stock prices. At the .100 level, only
four firms have significant pre- and/or post-issue U.S. betas. Only seven firms have significant pre-issue European
betas, and only eight firms have significant post-issue betas. To the extent GDRs lp integrate Indian markets with
world markets, the insignificant foreign market betas and the insignificant coefficients in regression (4) are inconsistent
with the evidence in BH. However, the limitations (discussed in Section II) Indian law still imposes on investors to own
and trade Indian shares and/or GDRs may impede the process of impounding world market news into Indian firms’ share
prices.
In contrast to the insignificant foreign market betas, domestic betas are significant for 58 (56) of the firms in
our pre-issue (post-issue) periods. The mean (median) pre-issue beta, .783 (.782), is also close to the mean (median)
post-issue beta, .790 (.702). Only 17 domestic betas change significantly after the issue.18 Of course, dom stic betas
need not change if firm and market volatilities move proportionately in the same direction.
To discern whether the decline in the volatilities reported above results from market movements only or from
firm-specific events also, we separate the two effects with market model regressions. Specifically, we estimate firm-
specific volatilities as the absolute values of residuals from regressions of Indian firms’ returns against returns on the
Indian index over trading days -200 through -25 and days +25 through +200. We then substitute these estimates for the
CEMY and Parkinson estimates in regression (3). Thirty-six revised regressions (3) produce estimates of a4 that differ
significantly from the corresponding estimates of a1. Of the significant differences, 25 are negative. The correlations
between the differences (a4-a1) measured with the market model residuals and the CEMY (.895) and Parkinson (.395)
methods are also significant. Thus, much of the decline in CEMY and Parkinson estimates appears to be firm- pecific.19
Whether the decline is also related to the GDR issue per se is the subject of our next series of tests.
Figure 5 depicts mean estimates of the firm-specific standard deviations from the market model regressions
over four subperiods. The subperiods do n t correspond to the dummy variable designations in regressions (3). Instead,
we divide “Before” and “After” into halves to discern whether the post-issue decline is a natural progression from the
pre-issue decline or a more immediate decline associated with the GDR issue. The graph supports the second view.
9Mean estimates of firm-specific volatilities are .0186, .0188, .0168, and .0156 for the first through fourth subperiods,
respectively. Matched-pair tests of the hypothesis that sequential mean differences between firm-specific volatilities
equal zero produce t-statistics of .12 (period 1 - period 2), 1.92 (period 2 - period 3), and 1.06 (period 3 - period 4).
Thus, the most significant shift in firm-specific volatilities appears to occur immediately after the GDR issue. We also
look at median differences between volatilities in sequential subperiods by computing Wilcoxon sign tests. These tests
yield z-statistics of .77, 1.03, and 2.34. In contrast to the t-tests, therefore, the sign tests indicate that the most significant
shift occurs between the third and fourth, rather than between the second and third, subperiods.
Our final robustness test on the timing of firm-specific volatility shifts ranks volatilities for each GDR issue
across ubperiods. If change is random, the subperiods should have approximately equal numbers of high, low, and
medium ranks. The frequencies in Table 8, however, correspond closely to the subperiods. T  first subperiod has the
highest frequency (21) of the highest volatility ranks, and the last subperiod has the highest frequency (26) of the lowest
volatility ranks. The second and third subperiods have the highest frequencies of the second- and third-largest ranks,
respectively. A 2-statistic with nine degrees of freedom rejects the hypothesis at the .001 level that volatility rankings
are evenly distributed across subperiods. Diagonal entries suggest, instead, that the decline in firm-specific volatilities is
a gradual shift before and after the GDRs were issued, rather than a sudden move associated specifically with the GDR
issues. However, column-by-column tests of the hypothesis that frequencies in the respective subperiods have uniformly
distributed rankings produce 2-statistics (with three degrees of freedom) with p-values of .292, .753, .112, and .004.
Thus, the significance of the tests using the total table derives mostly from deviations in the third and (especially) the
fourth subperiods. On balance, therefore, Table 8 produces evidence that is consistent the t- and Wilcoxon sign tests
above.20
Though our tests of the immediacy with which firm-specific volatilities decline after GDR issues produce some
ambiguity, we now examine the extent to which such declines relate to changes in firm-specific profile variables. To do
so, we again use differences in mean volatilities as in regressions (3). This attempt is consistent with event study
attempts to explain cross-sectional variations in event period abnormal returns. It is also consistent with efforts by BH
who model differences in cross-country volatilities as a function of differences in emerging market attributes across
countries. Because we have only Indian firms in our sample, however, we focus on cross-firm, rather than cross-country,
differences. Specifically, we run the following regression
in which Sd i is the difference (after-before) in firm-specific volatilities estimated from the market model regressions;
Rule144A, Reg S, and Tandem are collectively exhaustive dummy variables that indicate the type of SEC provision
under which the GDR was issued;  Lev i and  Profi are, respectively, percentage changes in debt-equity ratios and
operating profit margins in year 0 compared with the respective means over years t-3 through t-1; Relindexi is the ratio
from Figure 1 of the level of the Indian Index relative the World Index 25 days before the GDR issue; Seqi is a sequence
variable for i = 1, ..., 60, for the first through last GDRs issued in our sample; ABSdi is the standardized abnormal
volatility for firm i during the issue period; and pos and neg are dummy variables indicating the sign of the issue period
abnormal return. Justification for our use of these regressors follows below.
GDR issues in our sample raise equity and reduce financial leverage. If stock price volatilities change strictly
because the balance sheet mix of debt and equity changes, the coefficient on L v i () should be positive. However,
GDR issues can also affect the asset side of the balance sheet when proceeds are used for investments. If reductions in
business risk resulting from these investments combine with changes in financial leverage to induce larger changes in
volatility, a small (i.e., less negative) value of Lev i c uld be associated with a large (i.e., more negative) value of  Sdi
, and  would be negative. Thus, the sign of  can be positive or negative depending on the use of funds and the impact
on business risk.
In the Myers/Majluf (1984) pecking order, firms use external equity only when internal funds are not available
and/or when external equity is overvalued. If internal funds for Indian firms are declining but external equity is
overvalued because the market understands the declining cash flows but underestimates the risk in the pre-issue period
[Healy and Palepu (1989)], we expect the coefficient on  Profi () to be negative. The negative estimates of Sd i for
most firms in our sample, however, suggest that the market does not und restimate risk for these firms. A negative
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estimate of  with Sd i negative suggests that risk is declining while profitability is
increasing. A positive , on the other hand, suggests that firms rely on external equity because internal sources are
declining.
The concentration of GDR issues in Table 1 and the relative market performance in Figure 1 suggest a window
of opportunity approach to fund raising. Relindex is our attempt to deal with that issue. If Indian managers time the
market, we expect  to be positive because managers would issue equity just before an increase in risk. A negative or
insignificant estimate of  would be inconsistent with that hypothesis.
Other things constant, BH (2000) argue that early issues of ADRs are likely to produce larger marginal effects
than later issues, but that the marginal effect declines gradually with each issue. To accommodate that possibility, BH
introduce a decay variable. Our simplified version of that variable is SEQi. If Sd i more (less) negative for early (late)
GDR issues, we expect the coefficient on SEQi to be positive.
Finally, the higher issue period volatilities in Figures 3 and 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that imperfectly
anticipated information is released on the issue date. To capture that information, we use ABSdi. We partition ABSdi
with the pos and neg dummy variables because, presumably, the decrease in volatility is “good news” and the
subsequent reduction in volatility will be signaled by positive spikes in stock prices.
Table 9 shows results of regression (5). The first regression includes only the intercepts spliced by the SEC
provision under which the GDR was issued. The next five regressions include the intercepts and one other (different for
each regression) independent variable. The final regression includes all variables as listed in equation (5). The results
support the hypotheses that Indian GDRs help reduce financial and business risk and that they help resolve the
Myers/Majluf (1984) problem because firms issue external equity even when internal cash flows are increasing. The
results provide weaker support for the hypothesis that early issues induce a larger decline than later issues. The
regressions provide no support for the window of opportunity hypothesis or for the hypothesis that the issue-period pike
in volatility signals the direction of future changes in volatility.
Though interesting, the regressions in Table 9 should be interpreted with caution because they are sensitive to
variable definitions and to the inclusion or exclusion of certain regressors in the analysis. Expressing  Lev i and  Profi
as raw (rather than percentage) changes in leverage and profitability produces insignificant estimates of  and ,
respectively. Moreover, the price of the GDR relative to the price of the underlying share reflects how QIBs value the
GDRs and should (given the hypotheses we consider) predict changes in volatility as readily as the variables we report.
However, the relative price variable lacks predictive ability in these tests. Such weaknesses make our cross-sectional
results more fragile than we would like.
Nevertheless, the regressions indicate that firm-specific mean volatilities are lower after Indian firms issue
GDRs than they were before. The coefficients in the first regression in Table 9 are negative for each SEC provision, and
they are significant for Rule 144A and tandem offers. This finding contrasts with those reported by Healy and Palepu
(1989) for U.S. seasoned equity offerings. We also report some (albeit ambiguous) support for the hypothesis that the
decline in volatilities is related to the GDR issue per e. To the extent that conclusion is correct, our evidence shows that
part of the decline in volatility that BH document in emerging markets is attributable to firm-specific events, such as
GDR issues. To the extent that conclusion is incorrect, however, it suggests that firm-specific volatilities in emerging
markets may decline only gradually even after firm-specific events.
V. CONCLUSION
Volatilities decline for most Indian firms in our sample that issued GDRs nto European and U.S. markets
between 1992 and 1997. Variance reductions also occur in the Indian index. However, neither the European nor the
U.S. index experiences similar declines. Only scanty evidence exists of volatility spillovers from Europe and the U.S. to
India either before or after GDRs were issued, and evidence that foreign-market betas change (or are even significant in
the pre- and post-issue periods) is equally weak. These findings are consistent with Bekaert a d Harvey (1997 and
2000) and with Aggarwal, Inclan, and Leal (1999) who report that changes in volatility in emerging markets are more
likely to come from local as opposed to global factors. However, the volatility changes are also firm specific. Thus, part
of the gradual decline in volatilities that Bekaer and Harvey document may relate to firm-specific events that contribute
to the liberalization process. Even following firm-specific events, however, the decline in firm-specific volatilities may
be gradual.
Table 1
Calendar Time Distribution f Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs) Issues by Indian Firms
This table reports the calendar time distribution of equity-backed Global Depositary Receipt issues by Indian firms
between 1992 and 1997. Economic Times, an Indian business daily similar to the Wall Street Journal, gives the month
and year of each issue. Fifty firms in our sample issued one GDR; five firms issued two.
Calendar Time Distribution of Issues in Sample
Year Total Sample Rule 144A Regulation S Tandem
1992 2 1 1 0
1993 6 2 4 0
1994 37 16 7 14
1995 4 0 1 3
1996 9 3 0 6
1997 2 0 0 2
  Total 60 22 13 25
Table 2
Distribution of Sample by Exchange Where Indian GDRs Trade
This table summarizes Global Depositary Receipts issued by Indian firms between 1992 and 1997 by the exchange on
which the GDRs trade. Data for the exchange come from Bloomberg. Diagonal cells indicate trading on a single
exchange. Off diagonal cells represent c o s-trading on multiple exchanges. Duplicating cells, which are mirror images,
are left blank. The cells in the last column do not sum to 60 because they include cross-listings. The London
International is a Designated Offshore Securities Market as per the SEC and is not the same as the London Stock
Exchange.
Exchange
Exchange
London
International Luxembourg Frankfurt
All
Three
Total
Traded
Here
London
International 1 - - - 37
Luxembourg 21 21 - - 56
Frankfurt 3  2 0 12 17 
Table 3
Summary Estimates of Daily Volatility of Returns on Stocks of Indian Firms
That Issued Global Depositary Receipts between 1991 and 1997
Method of Estimating Volatility *
Security CEMY Parkinson
Indian Firms in Sample
   Mean Volatility Estimate .0209 .0228
   Median Volatility Estimate .0194 .0205
   Mean Lag 1 Autocorrelation 0.206 0.387
  Mean Correlation Across Methods 0.493 Na
Indian Index (BSE)
   Mean Volatility Estimate .0123 .0078
   Median Volatility Estimate .0117 .0076
   Mean Lag 1 Autocorrelation 0.184 0.383
   Mean Correlation Across Methods 0.492 Na
U.S. Index (S&P 500)
   Mean Volatility Estimate .0048 .0049
   Median Volatility Estimate .0045 .0046
   Mean Lag 1 Autocorrelation -0.010 0.220
  Mean Correlation Across Methods  0.657 Na
European Index (Bloomberg)
   Mean Volatility Estimate .0057 Na
   Median Volatility Estimate .0058 Na
   Mean Lag 1  Autocorrelation -0.049 Na
  Mean Correlation Across Methods Na Na
* CEMY estimates are the square roots of the Vi,t in equation (1). Parkinson estimates are as given by
equation (2).
Table 4
Tests of the Hypothesis that Mean Daily Volatility is Stable over Long and Short Horizons
Surrounding the Issuance of Global Depositary Receipts
Mean and Median Coefficient Estimates
Mean and Median p-values from Tests of the
Hypotheses that
Method/Firms
a1 a2 a3 a4 a1 = a2 a2 = a3 a3 = a4 a1 = a4
CEMY
    Indian Firms in Sample .0177
.0168
.0174
.0151
.0167
.0148
.0157
.0155
.313
.163
.354
.293
.284
.166
.238
.054
    Indian Index (BSE) .0134
.0135
.0129
.0111
.0117
.0103
.0109
.0106
.174
.056
.326
.213
.231
.098
.154
.022
    U.S. Index (S&P 500) .0046
.0044
.0053
.0048
.0050
.0048
.0049
.0047
.292
.159
.461
.465
.328
.218
.321
.143
    European Index (Bloomberg) .0060
.0061
.0059
.0058
.0058
.0060
.0055
.0055
.419
.455
.423
.475
.349
.288
.236
.189
Parkinson
    Indian Firms in Sample .0155
.0138
.0159
.0133
.0148
.0128
.0137
.0123
.232
.124
.348
.208
.324
.178
.181
.034
    Indian Index (BSE) .0082
.0084
.0079
.0066
.0108
.0062
.0072
.0061
.087
.003
.282
.143
.179
.055
.032
.000
    U.S. Index (S&P 500) .0046
.0046
.0050
.0048
.0049
.0049
.0050
.0047
.389
.242
.227
.146
.268
.188
.337
.164
    European Index (Bloomberg) Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
Table 5
Tests of the Hypothesis that Mean Daily Overnight Volatility is Stable over Long and Short Horizons
Surrounding the Issuance of Global Depositary Receipts
Mean and Median Coefficient Estimates
Mean and Median p-values from Tests of the
Hypotheses that
Method/Firms
a1 a2 a3 a4 a1 = a2 a2 = a3 a3 = a4 a1 = a4
Parkinson (Overnight)
    Indian Firms in Sample .0131
.0111
.0124
.0094
.0121
.0102
.0115
.0097
.316
.142
.375
.357
.338
.279
.284
.141
    Indian Index (BSE) .0055
.0058
.0048
.0036
.0042
.0038
.0036
.0036
.177
.008
.271
.210
.142
.050
.063
.003
    U.S. Index (S&P 500) .0004
.0003
.0005
.0003
.0004
.0003
.0004
.0003
.385
.307
.497
.479
.382
.344
.459
.455
    European Index (Bloomberg) Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
Table 6
Summary of Direction and Significance of Permanent Volatility Shifts
among Indian Firms that Issue GDRs, Compared with Shifts in Volatility
of Market Indexes in India, the United States, and Europe
Method of Estimating Volatility
Sample CEMY
Parkinson
(Trading)
Parkinson
(Overnight)
Indian Firms in Sample
   Number of Significant Differences (.10 level)
   Significant Negative Differences
36**
27**
37**
29**
28**
22**
Indian Index (BSE)
   Number of Significant Differences (.10 level)
   Significant Negative Differences
37**
32**
57**
44**
48**
47**
U.S. Index (S&P 500)
   Number of Significant Differences (.10 level)
   Significant Negative Differences
25**
8*
29**
3**
11**
5 
European Index (Bloomberg)
   Number of Significant Differences (.10 level)
   Significant Negative Differences
18**
14**
Na
Na
Na
Na
In 60 independent experiments, the expected number of differences between pre- and post-issue period volatilities
that are significant at the .10 level is 6. If a difference is significant and the movement is random,
approximately half of the differences should be positive and half negative. Double (single) asterisks, ** (*),
in the table indicate rejection of those hypotheses at the .05 (.10) level.
Table 7
Tests of the Hypothesis that with Constant Mean Effects and after Controlling for Movements in the Local Index,
Daily Volatility of Indian Stock Prices is Equally Sensitive to Volatility in the United States or Europe
before and after Indian Firms Issue Global Depository Receipts
Mean and Median Coefficient Estimates Mean and Median p-values from tests of the Hypotheses that
Sample/Method bbef baft c d bbef = 0 baft = 0 c = 0 d = 0 bbef = baft
j = S&P 500
   CEMY .109
.067
-.044
-.075
.529
.518
.165
.157
.423
.400
.374
.307
.070
.000
.093
.019
.328
.283
   Parkinson -.100
.074
-.251
-.185
.574
.502
.314
.323
.278
.197
.326
.225
.128
.003
.007
.000
.202
.052
j = European Index 
     (Lagged Only)
   CEMY .102
.125
-.038
-.067
.529
.525
.164
.153
.365
.268
.408
.360
.084
.000
.098
.020
.370
.247
   Parkinson Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
j = European Index
     (Sum of Lagged
      and Concurrent)
   CEMY .282
.283
.129
.059
.510
.486
.168
.149
.314
.238
.380
.397
.101
.000
.102
.024
.316
.208
   Parkinson Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
Table 8
Relative Ranks of Firm-Specific Volatilities Across Four Subperiods
Before and After the Issue of GDRs by Indian Firms
SubperiodNumber of Times
Volatility is Ranked
First Second Third Fourth
Highest 21 16 14 8
 Second Highest 15 18 11 15
Third Highest 13 13 23 10
Lowest 11 13 12 26
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END NOTES
1.  The next most frequent issuers account for only 7.65% (Taiwan) of the equity GDRs issu d under Rule 144A.  These
statistics are taken from the Bank of New York’s comprehensive listing of all GDRs issued through July 1998 and from
Bethel and Sirri (1998).  Bethel and Sirri (p. 31)  report that securities sold in the private markets in 1991 accounted for
only 2% of the securities sold in public markets.  By 1997, Rule 144A issues had catapulted to 20% of the dollar amount
of issues sold in public markets.  Between 1991 and 1997, the aggregate dollar volume of 144A debt issues was 591.4
billion. Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2000) analyze Rule 144A issues of foreign and domestic debt. The aggregate dollar
volume for common equity was 27.0 billion dollars.  Indian GDRs account for about 22% of that dollar volume.
2.  Jayaraman, Shastri, and Tandon (1993) document increased volatility after foreign firms issue ADRs.  They argue,
based on a model they cite by Freedman (1989), that cross listings allow informed traders to trade on long-lived
information in multiple markets.  Though the increased trade in Freedman’s analysis increases volatility, it is,
nonetheless, good because it improves market efficiency.   Whereas Ja araman et al. study ADRs issued predominantly
by English and Japanese firms, we examine  Rule 144A and Regulation S GDRs issued exclusively by Indian firms.
3.  Efficient markets should process information on announcement (not issue) dates.  However, information regarding
terms of GDR issues is often not revealed until just before the issue date.  Thus, our use of issue dates is not
incompatible with market efficiency.  Conrad (1989) also finds that most of the stock price response to option
introductions in the U.S. occurs when options are actually introduced, rather than when they are announced.
4.  See “Depositary Receipts: Citibank 1999 Year-End Review” and the Bank of New York DR summary.
5.   The discussion in this section closely follows Bethel and Sirri (1998) and Bloomenthal (1998).  Broadly defined,
QIBs are 1) institutional investors whose o n securities portfolios equal at least $100 million, 2) banks and savings and
loans that, besides the $100 million portfolio requirement, also have $25 million or more in net assets, and 3) securities
dealers registered under the Exchange Act who have at least a $10 million portfolio.  An entity wholly owned by any
QIB, except a bank or insurance company,  is also a QIB.
6.  These markets include Amsterdam, Australia, Brussels, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, London International (not the London
Stock Exchange), Johannesburg, Luxembourg, Milan, Montreal, Paris, Stockholm, Tokyo, Toronto, Vancouver, and
Zurich.
7.   Physical settlements occur through the Clearing House, while book-entry settlements occur through depositaries.
Funds settlements take place through designated clearing banks. The Clearing Corporation strictly enforces penalties
for the noncompliance with settlement procedures.  These details come from various publications of the Securities and
Exchange Board of India
8.  See Business Line; Jan. 27, 2000 and Economic Times; Oct. 5, 1999.
9.  Because these Foreign Institutional Investors are from all over the world, the actual number of U.S. Foreign
Institutional Investor’s that qualify to be QIBs must be significantly less than 200.
10.  Fifty firms in our sample issued one GDR; five firms issued two. There were 11 issues by conglomerates and 11 by
textile firms.  There were five issues by automotive companies and five by chemical firms.  There were four issues by
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
pharmaceutical firms and four by telecommunications firms.  The fertilizer, hotel, and mining industries each had three
events in the sample.  No other industry had more than one event.
11.  Though there is a clustering of GDR issues in the event years, there is no similar clustering across months, or days
of the month as documented by Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) for U.S. offerings.
12.    On average, for the 60 firms in our sample, 486 business days are needed to get the 401 trading days for the
analysis.  The additional 85 days, which came from adjustments for holidays in the Indian, European, and U.S. markets
and from nontrading in India, were not uniformly spaced across the 401 observation interval.  One firm had  gap of 29
business days between two observations with return data.  Though that was the largest gap in our sample, over half the
sample had at least two successive return observations separated by nine business days. 
13.  Variations of Parkinson’s estimator are discussed in Garman and Kl ss (1980), Ball and Torous (1984), and
Kunitomo (1992).
14.   Annualized standard deviations equal .3304 and .3605 for the CEMY and Parkinson methods, respectively.  By
comparison, BH estimate the annualized standard deviation for India to be .2716.  S nce our estimates are for individual
securities and their estimate is for a portfolio, our estimates are consistent with their estimate.
15.  Using issue-date abnormal returns, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1999) argue that this effect reflects at least a partial
resolution of information asymmetries between Indian firms and international and home-market investors.
16.  The results are qualitatively the same when we use only a 10-day window before and after the issue date.
17.  Karolyi and Stulz (1996) find that the size of the market movement influences correlations across markets. 
Therefore, we also run regression (4) for each firm using only the quartile of the largest lagged volatility estimates from
the U.S. and European indexes.  The mean (median) p-values for tests of the hypothesis that Indian firms became more
susceptible to large shocks from the U.S. or European markets after the GDR were issued are .34, .39, and .36 (.28,
.32, and .29) for the Parkinson, CEMY (U.S.), and CEMY (European) methods, respectively.  Thus, the post-issue
susceptibility to large shocks from foreign markets is insignificantly different from the pre-issue susceptibility for most
firms in our sample.
18.   These findings contrast with findings in Ramchand and Sethapakdi (2000) who report that the domestic (foreign)
component of systematic risk decreases (increases) following global equity issues by U.S. firms. Ramchand and
Sethapakdi interpret their evidence to be consistent with market segmentation hypotheses.  Though the Indian market is
undoubtedly segmented from other world capital markets, our evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that GDR
issues help Indian firms resolve firm-specific information asymmetries.
19.   Instead of market model regressions, we also estimate changes in firm-specific volatilities by adding time-varying
volatilities of the local index, VolBSE,t to regression (3) and comparing a4 and a1.  Using this approach, we detect 25 (33)
significant differences with the CEMY (Parkinson) method, 18 (22) of which are negative.  Thus, these results are
generally consistent with the results based on market model regressions.
20.  Dividing “Before” and “After” into three, as opposed to two, periods each provides stronger evidence of a pre-issue
decline.  However, if early issues by some firms cause the market to anticipate future issues by other firms, even a pre-
issue decline may be consistent with the hypothesis that the decline is associated with the GDR issue.   The clustering in
our sample makes this argument all the more plausible if partial anticipation influences volatilities.
